Avis institutionnel52024AS106107
Aide d’État — Belgique — Aide d’État SA.106107 (2024/N) — Prolongation de la durée de vie de deux réacteurs nucléaires (Doel 4 et Tihange 3) — Invitation à présenter des observations en application de l’article 108, paragraphe 2, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne
| CELEX | 52024AS106107 |
| Type | Avis institutionnel |
| Date | jeudi 8 août 2024 |
Résumé IA
Cet avis de la Commission européenne, publié au titre de l'article 108, paragraphe 2, du TFUE, ouvre une procédure formelle d'examen concernant une aide d'État notifiée par la Belgique visant à prolonger de dix ans l'exploitation des réacteurs nucléaires Doel 4 et Tihange 3. La Commission invite les parties intéressées à présenter leurs observations sur la compatibilité de cette mesure avec le marché intérieur, notamment au regard des règles sur les aides d'État, en raison de doutes sérieux quant à son caractère nécessaire, proportionné et non discriminatoire. Cette procédure est cruciale pour les professionnels du droit français car elle pourrait influencer la jurisprudence et la pratique décisionnelle en matière d'aides d'État dans le secteur énergétique, en particulier pour les projets de prolongation de centrales nucléaires.
Texte intégral
 | Journal officiel | FR Série C |
| C/2024/4921 | 8.8.2024 |
AIDE D’ÉTAT — BELGIQUE
Aide d’État SA.106107 (2024/N) — Prolongation de la durée de vie de deux réacteurs nucléaires (Doel 4 et Tihange 3)
Invitation à présenter des observations en application de l’article 108, paragraphe 2, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne
(Texte présentant de l’intérêt pour l’EEE)
(C/2024/4921)
Par lettre du 22 juillet 2024, reproduite dans la langue faisant foi dans les pages qui suivent le présent résumé, la Commission a notifié à la Belgique sa décision d'ouvrir la procédure prévue à l'article 108, paragraphe 2, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne à l'égard de la mesure susmentionnée.
Les parties intéressées peuvent présenter leurs observations sur l’aide dans un délai d’un mois à compter de la date de publication du présent résumé et de la lettre qui suit, à l’adresse suivante:
| Commission européenne, |
| Direction générale de la concurrence |
| Greffe des aides d’État |
| 1049 Bruxelles |
| BELGIQUE |
Ces observations seront communiquées à la Belgique. Le traitement confidentiel de l’identité de la partie intéressée qui présente les observations et/ou d’éléments de ces observations peut être demandé par écrit, en spécifiant les motifs de la demande.
TEXTE DU RESUME
Procédure
La Belgique a entamé des contacts préalables à la notification en janvier 2023. Plusieurs réunions ont été organisées avec les autorités belges et plusieurs documents ont été échangés pendant que les négociations entre l’État belge et les parties avançaient. La Belgique a finalement notifié la mesure le 21 juin 2024.
Description de l’aide
Dans le contexte de la crise énergétique de 2022 et de la guerre en Ukraine, afin de réduire la dépendance de la Belgique à l’égard des combustibles fossiles et de contribuer à la sécurité d’approvisionnement, le gouvernement belge a décidé de prolonger de dix ans la durée de vie de deux réacteurs nucléaires (Doel 4 et Tihange 3). Il était prévu que ces deux réacteurs nucléaires, dont Electrabel, filiale d’Engie, est le propriétaire majoritaire et l’exploitant unique, ferment en 2025, conformément à la loi de 2003 sur la sortie du nucléaire en Belgique. L’autre propriétaire (minoritaire) des deux centrales nucléaires est Luminus, filiale d’EDF.
La prolongation de la durée de vie des deux réacteurs nucléaires accroît le profil de risque d’Engie et l’oblige à modifier sa stratégie commerciale. Le gouvernement belge, Engie et Electrabel ont donc décidé de mettre en place un partenariat pour la gestion des activités nucléaires prolongées en Belgique. Le 13 décembre 2023, le gouvernement belge, Engie et Electrabel ont signé un ensemble d’accords couvrant tous les aspects du partenariat, en vue de redémarrer les deux réacteurs d’ici au 1er novembre 2025, après les travaux nécessaires à la prolongation de leur durée de vie.
L’accord, qui fait l’objet d’une clause de suspension conformément aux règles en matière d’aides d’État, prévoit quelques interventions, qui peuvent être regroupées en trois grandes composantes:
Composante 1
Dispositions financières et structurelles
| — | Le préfinancement des coûts et dépenses d’Electrabel pour les activités de développement jusqu’à l’entrée en vigueur de toutes les modifications législatives nécessaires, l’objectif étant de parvenir à terme à un partage égal des coûts (50/50). |
| — | La création d’une entreprise commune, BE-NUC, détenue à parts égales par l’État belge et Electrabel, avec une participation égale (au moyen d’une augmentation de capital) et une autorité décisionnelle. Tant l’État belge qu’Electrabel financeront l’entreprise commune. BE-NUC ne deviendra pas un exploitant nucléaire: Electrabel est et restera le seul exploitant des deux réacteurs nucléaires dans le cadre d’un accord d’exploitation et de maintenance, prévoyant des droits de contrôle de BE-NUC sur les coûts d’exploitation. Electrabel et le gouvernement belge émettront également, pour BE-NUC, des prêts d’actionnaires (respectivement le «prêt d’actionnaires d’Electrabel» et le «prêt d’actionnaires du gouvernement belge») sur une base pari passu afin de financer toute dépense prévue par le pacte d’actionnaires. |
| — | Divers mécanismes de soutien financier, dont une facilité de financement du fonds de roulement et des prêts liés aux coûts de fermeture, un paiement minimal des charges d’exploitation et des charges de capital et un contrat sur différence bidirectionnel afin de veiller à ce que l’entreprise commune et Luminus (en leur qualité de copropriétaires des réacteurs et de l’électricité produite) perçoivent des revenus suffisants de la production d’électricité pour investir dans les réacteurs et les exploiter et pour obtenir un rendement financier approprié (taux de rendement cible de 7 %), tout en réduisant leurs risques opérationnels et de marché et en transférant à l’État belge les recettes qui ne sont pas nécessaires pour atteindre cet objectif. |
| — | La mise en place d’un accord sur les services de gestion de l’énergie avec un tiers ou une entité d’Engie, qui agira en qualité d’agent de BE-NUC pour vendre la production d’électricité sur le marché de gros de l’électricité. |
Composante 2
Transfert des passifs liés aux déchets nucléaires, au combustible usé et au déclassement
| — | Un plafonnement du passif des producteurs de déchets radioactifs issus de la production d’électricité au moyen de l’énergie nucléaire afin de réduire l’incertitude quant au coût futur des déchets nucléaires et du combustible usé, par le versement d’un montant forfaitaire de 15 milliards d’EUR par l’exploitant nucléaire. |
| — | Transfert à l’État belge des passifs de déclassement plus élevés de tous les réacteurs nucléaires belges, dans la mesure où ils résultent de la prolongation de la durée de vie et qu'ils peuvent être prouvés par Electrabel. |
Composante 3
Protections juridiques
| — | Des dispositions relatives aux protections juridiques, qui définissent le partage des risques en cas de modifications législatives futures, notamment en ce qui concerne les exploitants nucléaires en Belgique ou les activités nucléaires d’Electrabel et ayant une incidence négative sur les clauses substantielles de la transaction. |
Les bénéficiaires finaux des mesures sont Engie, dont sa filiale Electrabel, et EDF, dont ses filiales Luminus et EDF Belgium.
L’accord proposait un ensemble d’actes juridiques qui mettent en œuvre l’opération entre Engie et l’État belge, notamment:
| — | une modification de la loi de sortie du nucléaire de 2003, |
| — | une loi visant à garantir la sécurité d’approvisionnement dans le secteur de l’énergie et réformant le secteur de l’énergie nucléaire (ci-après la «loi Phoenix»), |
| — | une loi portant création, organisation et fonctionnement du service administratif à comptabilité autonome et diverses dispositions relatives à l’échange des informations («loi BE-WATT»), et |
| — | une loi portant création, organisation et fonctionnement d’un organisme de droit public ayant pour objet d’assumer la responsabilité financière de certaines obligations nucléaires («loi Hedera»). |
Les coûts des mesures seront financés sur le budget de l’État, y compris les remboursements potentiels du contrat sur différence bidirectionnel.
Appréciation
Existence d’une aide
La Commission considère que toutes les composantes de la mesure notifiée figurant dans les accords entre l’État belge, Electrabel et Engie relèvent d’une seule et même intervention, étant donné qu’elles concernent toutes le même événement, à savoir la prolongation de la durée de vie des deux réacteurs nucléaires. L’accord sur le transfert des passifs liés aux déchets nucléaires, au combustible usé et au déclassement, ainsi que les protections juridiques figuraient également parmi les exigences d’Engie pour arriver à un accord sur la prolongation de la durée de vie et font donc partie intégrante de la conclusion de l’accord global. Étant donné que le contrat sur différence bidirectionnel établit un flux de recettes stable pour la production d’électricité à partir de sources nucléaires, protégeant ainsi les propriétaires des centrales contre les risques de marché, et étant donné que les différents mécanismes de soutien financier précités protègent ces mêmes propriétaires contre une part des risques opérationnels, un avantage sélectif est accordé à Electrabel et à Luminus, en tant que copropriétaires des réacteurs nucléaires, au moyen de ressources d’État, qui constituent une aide d’État.
Effet incitatif de l’aide
Avant la décision de la Belgique de prolonger la durée de vie des deux réacteurs nucléaires en 2022, Engie avait déjà annoncé son intention de quitter le secteur nucléaire en Belgique après 2025 et hésitait initialement à accepter la prolongation de la durée de vie, faisant valoir que l’énergie nucléaire était devenue trop chère et trop risquée. Par conséquent, toutes les composantes de la mesure notifiée étaient nécessaires pour qu’Engie accepte de poursuivre l’exploitation des deux unités concernées par l’exploitation à long terme. La Commission considère donc, à ce stade, qu’il est plausible que les mesures notifiées aient un effet incitatif sur Engie et Electrabel.
Respect de la législation de l’UE applicable
La mesure a été notifiée à la Commission en application du TFUE et du traité Euratom et a été précédée d’une évaluation des incidences sur l’environnement. Les coûts liés à l’accord sont couverts par le budget de l’État si nécessaire et les bénéfices du projet reviennent au budget de l’État, de sorte qu’il n’y a pas de ressources affectées à la mesure et que les dispositions des articles 30 et 110 du TFUE sont respectées. Néanmoins, la Commission doute que les mécanismes du contrat sur différence soient conformes aux principes de conception de ce contrat énoncés à l’article 19 quinquies, paragraphe 2, du règlement (UE) 2024/1747. Par conséquent, la Commission ne peut conclure, à ce stade, que les mesures proposées sont conformes aux dispositions pertinentes du droit de l’Union.
Nécessité de l’aide
Conformément aux dispositions d’Euratom, le transfert des passifs liés à la gestion des déchets radioactifs a pour objectif de garantir le financement de la gestion du combustible usé et des déchets radioactifs en tant que condition préalable à une gestion responsable et sûre de ces matières et est donc nécessaire. Il en va de même pour l’accord sur les protections juridiques, qui est nécessaire dans le cas du nucléaire pour faire face aux risques réglementaires et politiques.
En ce qui concerne les mesures de soutien financier, la Commission reconnaît qu’il est nécessaire que l’exploitant nucléaire et les propriétaires des réacteurs nucléaires disposent d’une source stable de revenus, qui peut être fournie par le contrat sur différence bidirectionnel, compte tenu des incertitudes liées au futur prix sur le marché de l’électricité. Toutefois, la Commission n’est actuellement pas en mesure de conclure que les mesures supplémentaires s’ajoutant au contrat sur différence bidirectionnel sont toutes nécessaires, en particulier la création d’une entreprise commune dont le gouvernement belge sera actionnaire, le paiement minimal des charges d’exploitation et des charges de capital ainsi que les prêts liés aux coûts de fermeture. Par conséquent, à ce stade, la Commission émet des doutes quant à la nécessité de l’aide.
Caractère approprié de l’aide
Compte tenu de l’existence de défaillances du marché liées aux coûts incertains de la gestion des déchets et du déclassement, ainsi qu’aux risques politiques et réglementaires, la Commission estime que l’accord sur le transfert des passifs liés aux déchets nucléaires et au combustible usé ainsi que les protections juridiques sont appropriés pour remédier à ces défaillances respectives du marché.
Toutefois, la Commission émet des doutes quant à la conception du contrat sur différence proposé par la Belgique, car elle n’encourage pas suffisamment à réagir aux conditions du marché et à programmer une maintenance de la manière la plus efficace possible. À cet égard, la Commission se demande également si le prix du marché journalier utilisé comme prix de référence du marché dans la conception du contrat sur différence est l’option la plus appropriée pour fournir les incitations appropriées au lancement de la production d’électricité. En outre, le paquet de mesures de rémunération pourrait soulager les bénéficiaires d’une part trop importante des risques opérationnels et de marché. Pour ces raisons, la Commission émet des doutes quant au caractère approprié de l’aide.
Proportionnalité de l’aide
La Commission a des doutes quant à la proportionnalité de plusieurs des mesures de rémunération financière (dont les prêts liés aux coûts de fermeture et le paiement minimal des charges d’exploitation et des charges de capital). Ces mesures sont combinées à un contrat sur différence et devraient atteindre, d’après leur conception, le taux de rendement cible de 7 %, qui ne peut être évalué qu’au regard des mesures elles-mêmes et de la réduction des risques qu’elles apportent. Par conséquent, la proportionnalité de ce taux de rendement cible ne peut pas être évaluée in abstracto et ne peut que suivre l’appréciation du caractère approprié des mesures.
En outre, la Commission émet des doutes quant à l’établissement du montant du paiement forfaitaire de 15 milliards d’EUR pour le transfert des passifs liés aux déchets nucléaires et au combustible usé, et quant au montant du transfert (potentiel) des passifs de déclassement résultant du projet d’exploitation à long terme. Par conséquent, à ce stade, la Commission émet des doutes quant à la nécessité de l’aide.
Effets sur le marché
La Commission considère que certaines caractéristiques des mesures peuvent entraîner des distorsions indues du marché. En particulier, la conception du contrat sur différence pourrait ne pas inciter l’exploitant nucléaire à réagir conformément aux signaux du marché, tandis que le prix du marché journalier pourrait ne pas être le prix de référence le plus approprié sur le marché. En outre, des assurances supplémentaires sont nécessaires quant à l’identité et à l’indépendance de l’agent vendant la production de la centrale sur le marché en application de l’accord sur les services de gestion de l’énergie.
Conclusion
La Commission a des doutes quant à la compatibilité de l’aide avec le marché intérieur et a donc décidé d’ouvrir la procédure formelle d’examen.
Conformément à l’article 16 du règlement (UE) 2015/1589 du Conseil (1), toute aide illégale peut faire l’objet d’une récupération auprès de son bénéficiaire.
(1) Règlement (UE) 2015/1589 du Conseil du 13 juillet 2015 portant modalités d'application de l'article 108 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne (JO L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 9, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/1589/oj).
TEXTE DE LA LETTRE
The Commission wishes to inform Belgium that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
1. THE PROCEDURE
| (1) | On 21 June 2024, further to pre-notification contacts, including conference calls, meetings and requests for information, to which responses were submitted, the Kingdom of Belgium («Belgium») notified the agreement to extend the lifetime of two nuclear reactors, Doel 4 and Tihange 3, concluded between Engie S.A. («Engie») and the Belgian government on 13 December 2023. |
| (2) | By letter dated 14 February 2024, Belgium agreed to exceptionally waive its rights deriving from Article 342 TFEU in conjunction with Article 3 of Regulation 1/1958 (1) and to have the present decision notified and adopted in English. |
2. BACKGROUND ON THE ENERGY SECTOR IN BELGIUM
2.1. Nuclear fleet in Belgium
| (3) | Until 2022, Belgium’s nuclear park consisted of seven nuclear reactors, four located in Flanders (Doel) and three located in Wallonia (Tihange). All reactors came into operation between 1975 and 1985 (2) and were built by public utilities (Ebes, Intercom and Unerg) that were eventually merged to become Electrabel (majority owned by Tractebel) in 1990. In 1996, the Société Générale de Belgique («SGB») became the majority shareholder of Tractebel and in 1999, Suez acquired nearly 100 % of SGB. Since the merger between Suez and Gaz de France («GDF») in 2008, the ultimate owner of Electrabel has been Engie (3). |
| (4) | In 2003, the Belgian Federal Parliament adopted the «Nuclear Phase-Out law», establishing a nuclear phase-out between 2015 and 2025 («2003 Law» or «Nuclear Phase-Out law») (4). Article 3 of the Nuclear Phase-Out law prohibited the construction of new nuclear units aimed at the industrial production of electricity by nuclear fission in Belgium, and Article 4 limited the operation of the already existing reactors to 40 years. According to the Nuclear Phase-Out law, the closing dates of the nuclear plants in Belgium would have been 15 February 2015 (Doel 1), 1 December 2015 (Doel 2), 1 October 2022 (Doel 3), 1 July 2025 (Doel 4), 1 October 2015 (Tihange 1), 1 February 2023 (Tihange 2) and 1 September 2025 (Tihange 3). As initially foreseen by the Nuclear Phase-Out law, Doel 3 and Tihange 2 were permanently disconnected from the grid on 23 September 2022 and 31 January 2023 respectively. By the laws of 18 December 2013 and 28 June 2015 (5), the Nuclear Phase-Out law was amended and the lifetime of the three oldest reactors, Tihange 1, Doel 1 and Doel 2, was extended by 10 years, until 30 September 2025, 14 February 2025 and 30 November 2025 respectively (10-year lifetime extension) (6). According to the Nuclear Phase-Out law, Doel 4 and Tihange 3 were to close by 2025, but the Belgian government took the principle decision to reverse this decision in 2022 (see section 3.1 below). An overview is provided in Table 1. |
| (5) | Since 2020, Engie’s strategic objectives concerning nuclear activities were to (i) withdraw from nuclear activities in Belgium to de-risk its exposure as nuclear operator to market price volatility (7), and (ii) no longer position nuclear activity as part of Engie «s core business (8). This withdrawal has resulted in a halt to all studies relating to the extension of its nuclear power plants (all located in Belgium) from 2020 onwards. Engie’s financial communication since 2020 is in line with this strategic objective of withdrawal and has been taken into account in the accounting assumptions used to prepare the consolidated financial statements, in particular in impairment tests. |
| (6) | From 2022 onwards, the context changed when the Belgian government announced its decision to amend its energy policy by requesting the extension of the operation (Long-Term Operation, “LTO” (9)) of two of the seven nuclear reactors for 10 years (see section 3.1). Engie entered into discussions with the Belgian State to explore the modalities of this project, regardless of its previous communications to its shareholders and the markets. Since, according to Engie and Belgium, such a lifetime extension of the two nuclear reactors entails significant investments and risks for Engie, the Belgian State agreed with Engie to set up a mechanism to share, in a balanced and transparent manner, the risks and rewards in relation to the lifetime extension of the two reactors. According to Belgium, Engie made it clear from the start that without a risk sharing mechanism and a solution for the costs of nuclear waste stemming from the operation of the seven nuclear power plants, it would not consider the lifetime extension of the two nuclear reactors, which forces Engie to substantially modify its company strategy and risk exposure (10). |
| (7) | Electrabel, a subsidiary of Engie, has always been the nuclear operator and majority owner of the seven Belgian nuclear reactors. Today the ownership of the Belgian nuclear reactors is as follows:
|
| (8) | Table 1 below provides an overview of the seven Belgian nuclear reactors, including their ownership status, net capacity, and initial deactivation dates according to the Nuclear Phase-Out law and the revisions thereafter. Table 1 Overview nuclear power plants in Belgium
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2.2. Electricity market in Belgium
| (9) | Belgium’s energy mix is currently dominated by gas and nuclear-based electricity generation. More details on the wholesale and retail electricity market in Belgium and the market position of Electrabel and Luminus, are provided in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, respectively. |
2.2.1. Generation and wholesale market for electricity
| (10) | In 2022, after the closure of Doel 3, the total installed capacity across all voltage levels, i.e., including renewables connected to the distribution grid, reached 26 GW in 2022 (up from 21,4 GW in 2016) (12). The share of nuclear power generation in the total installed capacity in Belgium has been steadily decreasing from 27,6 % (5,9 GW) in 2016 to 18,7 % (4,8 GW) in 2022. Thermal power plants are the second largest source in terms of capacity with 30.7 % (8 GW) in 2022, decreasing from 39,3 % (8,4 GW) in 2016. The share of renewables has been steadily increasing over the past years, from 26,5 % (5,7 GW) in 2016 to 45,1 % (11,7 GW) in 2022. Coal has been fully phased-out in 2016. The total electricity generation capacity connected to the transmission grid in Belgium amounted to 15,7 GW in 2022, increasing from about 14 GW in 2016 (13). |
| (11) | According to Belgium, the main players in the electricity generation market, in terms of installed capacity connected at the transmission grid level (14), are Electrabel, Luminus, TotalEnergies, RWE and Eneco (15).
|
| (12) | During the period 2016 until 2022, electricity production from installations connected at the transmission grid level has been varying, reaching its lowest level in 2018 with 58,7 TWh, and its highest level in 2021 with 78,7 TWh. For installations connected across all voltage levels, electricity generation amounted to 75 TWh in 2018 and 100,5 TWh in 2021. The variation in generation output and resulting differences with electricity demand are compensated by imports and exports with interconnected markets.
|
| (13) | According to Belgium, the main players in terms of electricity generation from installations connected to the transmission grid (16) in Belgium are Electrabel, Luminus, Eneco, T-Power and RWE.
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| (14) | Besides market shares, the HHI (18) is used as a common index for market concentration.
|
2.2.2. Retail market for electricity
| (15) | According to Belgium, at the retail level, there were in total 17 electricity suppliers present in the regions of Brussels, Wallonia and Flanders in 2022 (19). The main suppliers are Electrabel, Luminus, TotalEnergies and Eneco, while many players are very small.
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| (16) | Market shares in terms of access points supplied were the largest for Electrabel (45,1 %), Luminus (22,6 %), Eneco (9,9 %) and TotalEnergies (9,2 %) in 2022, compared to 45,9 %, 20,2 %, 8,8 % and 7,7 % respectively in 2016. |
2.3. Objectives of the measure and alternative financing options
2.3.1. Resource adequacy concerns in Belgium
| (17) | Since 2019, the Belgian transmission system operator (“TSO”), Elia, conducted three national resource adequacy studies (“2019 NRAA”, “2021 NRAA” and “2023 NRAA”) (20), which all identified a systematic need for new capacity by the Winter of 2025-2026, as a consequence of the (partial) nuclear phase-out in Belgium, which started with the decommissioning of Doel 3 and Tihange 2 in 2022 and 2023 (see recital (4)), reinforced by the decommissioning of thermal generation capacities in neighbouring countries and problems with the French nuclear assets. |
| (18) | In order to address these resource adequacy concerns, Belgium set up a capacity mechanism (“CM”), approved by the Commission in 2021 (21), that will kick in as of Winter 2025. The Belgian CM aims at addressing resource adequacy concerns in electricity, while supporting the energy transition. Capacity holders that have been selected in CM auctions are awarded a capacity contract. The first capacity auctions have taken place in September 2021, 2022 and 2023, for delivery in 2025, 2026 and 2027, respectively. |
| (19) | In 2022, as a result of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, which caused additional concerns for security of supply and called for measures to reduce dependency on gas, the Belgian government decided to extend the lifetime of Doel 4 and Tihange 3 (see recital (29)). In 2023, Belgium amended the CM in order to take into account this lifetime extension, approved by the Commission in case SA.104336 (22). As shown in the 2023 NRAA, although the lifetime extension of the two nuclear reactors helps to address the resource adequacy concerns, the need for the CM remains. |
| (20) | Belgium submits that, while contributing to security of supply, the lifetime extension of the nuclear reactors also aims at (1) reducing the dependency on imported fossil fuels (in line with the REPowerEU objectives) and dependency on imports in general (23), and (2) supplying baseload capacity in the context of increased electrification needs in the near future in Belgium. In contrast, the CM is a market-wide measure that aims at compensating the readiness of plants to supply electricity in pre-defined periods, regardless of whether they produce or not (thereby ensuring sufficient capacity to guarantee that production meets demand). |
2.3.2. Market failures and financing of the LTO outside the CM
| (21) | Belgium argues that the lifetime extension of the two nuclear reactors requires a specific support package outside the CM, because of the specific economic situation and the specific risk profile of nuclear energy (24). |
| (22) | First, under the Nuclear Phase-Out law, the Belgian nuclear assets were legally bound to shut down by - at the latest - 2025. Subsequent governments confirmed this final phase-out date. Hence, the nuclear operator abandoned all preparations for their extension accordingly (see recital (5)). Since it has been decided in 2022 to have the two LTO Units operational again for ten more years, there is a need to refurbish the LTO Units depending on the approval by the Belgian Nuclear Safety Agency (AFCN/FANC (25)). The tight schedule for the LTO investments changes the cost, schedule of the LTO works and affects financing arrangements as no provisions for the LTO were made by Electrabel, in accordance with the legally defined closure of all nuclear power plants in 2025. In addition, the fuel costs and the costs of other necessary parts have risen sharply in recent years. The uncertainties regarding the LTO investment costs are therefore considerable. |
| (23) | Second, as recognised in the decision in case SA.104336 (26), Belgium submits that the objective of the capacity mechanism is to overcome a number of market failures which prevent energy producers to invest in additional generation capacity, such as (i) the lack of efficient price signals (e.g. energy prices are prevented from increasing up to the value of the VOLL), and (ii) risk aversion of investors at times of high volatility of energy prices and regulatory uncertainty. On top of the market failures present in the energy market in general, Belgium submits that electricity and carbon markets exhibit additional market failures, among others:
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| (24) | Third, Belgium argues that in addition to the general market failures as well as policy and regulatory uncertainties affecting investment in generation capacities in electricity markets (as described in recital (23)), a number of specificities of nuclear investments create further risks that are difficult to hedge or manage for merchant investors, and that cannot be addressed by the CM. Belgium submits that the objective of the notified measure is to overcome additional risks to which the nuclear operator is exposed:
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| (25) | Belgium argues that the existence of market failures and specific risks to nuclear operators, mentioned in recitals (23) and (24) respectively, may ultimately result in a situation where the expected market revenue stream is insufficient to ensure the economic viability of the lifetime extension of the LTO Units (i.e. the expected revenues are too low to ensure a sufficient return on investment given the different risks associated with this investment) or where the ongoing operations are not funded with cash, equity, or debt. Belgium argues that, in the light of these market failures, which are expected to persist in the near future, the specific risks related to nuclear power should be accounted for and therefore a commitment to support the nuclear lifetime extension is needed by the Belgian government. |
| (26) | Belgium also submits that the potential funding gap, singular economic situation and specific risk profile of the LTO Units cannot be adequately addressed through participation in the CM. First, the CM consists of a competitive process with annual auctions, which have by definition an uncertain outcome for the participants. However, the Belgian government decided that nuclear power should be part of Belgium’s energy mix for the next 10 years, which is not compatible with the uncertain outcome of an auction. Second, the remuneration through the CM auctions is also incompatible with the timing of the lifetime extension. In order for the nuclear capacities to be available by November 2025, the nuclear operator needs to start investments as soon as possible, which cannot await the outcome of the auction. Finally, the CM only aims at addressing the missing money/funding gap issue and does not help to overcome the specific risks to which the nuclear operator is exposed. |
| (27) | Therefore, participation by the nuclear operator in the CM auctions would not address the specific needs to support the nuclear capacities and their timely lifetime extension, and hence the choice was made by the Belgian State for a combination of the CM and a separate support mechanism in order to address the security of supply concerns in Belgium (28). |
| (28) | The Belgian government agreed with Engie on the measures as described in section 3, which should mitigate the above-mentioned market failures and risks, and provide an appropriate remuneration outside the CM. Belgium submits that the alternative support mechanism, consisting of several components as described in section 3, ensures the appropriate allocation of risks and allow the necessary investments in order to achieve the timely availability of the two nuclear reactors, while avoiding excessive remuneration and windfall profits. According to Belgium, the notified measure has the following objectives:
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3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURE
3.1. Background on the agreement with Engie and Electrabel
| (29) | On 18 March 2022, the Belgian federal government decided to reassess the nuclear phase-out, by allowing the extension of the operating lifetime of two of the then seven existing nuclear reactors, Doel 4 and Tihange 3, with a combined nominal power of approximately 2 GW (see Table 2 below), for a period of 10 years. The decision by Belgium was made in the context of the European response to the Russian war against Ukraine (including the need for EU Member States to reduce their gas consumption and gas dependency), the resulting gas crisis, the increased electrification needs (to enable the energy transition) and the low availability of the French nuclear fleet (due to unforeseen corrosion issues and extensive maintenance to prolong its operation lifetime). |
| (30) | Subsequently, the government started negotiations with the operator of Doel 4 and Tihange 3, Electrabel. Engie, the parent company of Electrabel, was initially hesitant to accept the lifetime extension, claiming that […]. Engie’s intention was to stop nuclear operations in Belgium after 2025 (see recital (5)). |
| (31) | On 21 July 2022, the Belgian State and Electrabel concluded a “letter of intent” for the extended operation of Doel 4 and Tihange 3. |
| (32) | On the basis of that letter of intent, the Belgian State, Engie and Electrabel concluded a “Heads of Terms and Commencement of Long-Term Operation (‘LTO’) Studies Agreement” on 9 January 2023, by which Electrabel initiated the studies required for the lifetime extension of Doel 4 and Tihange 3 and by which the parties continued the negotiations towards a more detailed definitive agreement regarding the lifetime extension of the two nuclear reactors with a view to restart operations (initially) on 1 November 2026. |
| (33) | These negotiations led to the signature of an Amendment to the Heads of Terms and Commencement of the LTO Studies Agreement on 29 June 2023, in which a number of agreements (“obligation of means”) were developed in more detail, in particular as regards the business model and the long-term storage and disposal of nuclear waste. On the same day, a Joint Development Agreement (“JDA”) was concluded, setting out the concrete actions taken by Engie and Electrabel with a view to a LTO within the time limit and the terms and conditions under which the Belgian State pre-finances certain costs of Electrabel linked to the development activities preparing for the extension of operation and the start of the actual works related to the lifetime extension. |
| (34) | On 21 July 2023, the Belgian State, Engie and Electrabel concluded a binding Framework Agreement which imposes an obligation (on a reasonable endeavour basis) on Engie and Electrabel to make it possible to restart the two nuclear reactors by 1 November 2025, one year earlier than initially foreseen, approved by the Belgian Nuclear Safety Authority. On the same day, the JDA was amended and restated “JDA+”. |
| (35) | On 13 December 2023, the Belgian State, Engie and Electrabel concluded a more detailed “Implementation Agreement” in which the agreements contained in the Framework Agreement are developed into definitive agreements. The implementation of these agreements and, more generally, the extension of the lifetime of the Doel 4 and Tihange 3 nuclear reactors require legislative intervention (see section 3.7). On this date, the “JDA++” was signed as well, thereby replacing the JDA+. |
| (36) | For the purpose of the present decision, the Implementation Agreement between the Belgian State, Engie and Electrabel consists of a set of measures to support the 10-year lifetime extension of Doel 4 and Tihange 3, which can be grouped along three main components:
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| (37) | The three components of the notified measure together aim at the lifetime extension of the two nuclear reactors (LTO Units) and a long-term solution on the financing of nuclear waste and spent fuel, will hereafter be referred to as the “LTO Project” or the “Transaction”. Belgium recognises that the three components of the notified measure, mentioned in recitals (36)(a), (36)(b) and (36)(c), can be assessed as part of one single intervention. |
| (38) | Electrabel is and will remain the sole nuclear operator in Belgium and will assume on its own all related tasks and obligations. Belgium submits in this respect that Electrabel is the only market party possessing the necessary know-how and authorizations to operate the LTO Units. Belgium further argues that access to nuclear generation capacity requires special, including country-specific, know-how which is not available to all market players, which the Commission previously acknowledged regarding Electrabel (30). The know-how, intellectual property, and relevant permits regarding nuclear installations in Belgium is unique and only Electrabel currently possesses them. Belgium also submits that in general, given the specificities of nuclear technology, only a limited number of operators have the knowledge and financial strength to undertake the investments needed and operate the nuclear reactors, which the Commission recognised in decisions concerning nuclear energy (31). Therefore, there is no credible alternative to Electrabel and the launch of a tender procedure to select the operator of the LTO Units would not have led to a meaningful outcome given the specificities and constraints of the LTO Project. |
| (39) | In addition, Belgium argues that, in order to enable the restart of the LTO Units in November 2025, Electrabel had to conduct certain preparatory works and feasibility studies (“Development Activities” (32)) before the actual start of works on the LTO, as early as possible and in parallel with the negotiations on the agreement with the Belgian government. With respect to these development activities (governed by the JDA++), Electrabel, in its role as sole nuclear operator in Belgium, has the unique knowledge to undertake these activities quickly and effectively. These activities require very specific knowledge, resources, and tools so that only Electrabel is technically able to carry them out. Therefore, given the timeframe necessary to avoid shortages in the electricity supply, the urgent need to limit dependency on fossil fuel imports and the specific constraints imposed by the LTO, no operator other than Electrabel could have been selected. |
3.2. Availability and technical details of Doel 4 and Tihange 3 after LTO restart
| (40) | Table 2 presents the nominal electricity production capacity, annual electricity production and share in national electricity demand in Belgium for Doel 4 and Tihange 3, before and after the lifetime extension (envisaged for 1 November 2025). Table 2 Key characteristics of Doel 4 and Tihange 3
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| (41) | The lower expected electricity production over the period 2026-2028 is due to more than usual scheduled outages of the two reactors during the restart phase (“scheduled LTO outages”). These planned LTO outages are required to bring the LTO Units in compliance with the requirements of the Belgian Nuclear Safety Authority for the LTO Project. The unavailability of the LTO Units during the scheduled LTO outages is expected to be 24 weeks per year and this during the first 3 years after the LTO restart date. On top of the scheduled LTO outages, a yearly normal outage (“scheduled non-LTO outages”) is expected for the whole period of the lifetime extension, up to 1 year before the end of operations for Doel 4 and until the last year of operations for Tihange 3. Each scheduled non-LTO outage is expected to last 6 weeks. As a result, during the first 3 years after LTO restart, the two nuclear reactors are expected to be shut down for 30 weeks. |
| (42) | On top of the scheduled outages mentioned in recital (41), there can be unplanned and unforeseen problems which require additional shut down of the LTO Units. A forced outage rate of 10 % has been assumed in the signing financial model (33) underlying the remuneration agreement. This implies that both Doel 4 and Tihange 3 have a target availability rate of 90 % over 10 years, when not considering the scheduled LTO and non-LTO outages. When including all scheduled outages, Doel 4 and Tihange 3 have a target availability rate of 68,43 % and 67,40 % respectively. |
3.3. Component 1: Financial and structural arrangements
| (43) | A set of sub-measures has been foreseen to allow for the financing of a timely and safe lifetime extension of the two nuclear reactors. |
3.3.1. Joint Development Agreement (JDA)
| (44) | As mentioned in recital (39), due to the strict timing for the LTO restart (to allow electricity production for the winter 2025/2026), Electrabel has, as nuclear operator, identified and agreed to undertake certain development activities, necessary to enable the LTO restart in time and necessary to meet the Safety Authority’s requirements and expectations, prior to entering into the final transaction. These development activities have been laid down in the JDA, amended by the JDA+ on 21 July 2023 and amended by the JDA++ on 13 December 2023. |
| (45) | According to the JDA++, the Belgian State pre-funds Electrabel’s costs and expenses for the development activities until all required legislative changes have been adopted and entered into force (the “Legislative Condition”). After the satisfaction or waiver of the Legislative Condition, Electrabel will fund its own costs and expenses for the development activities until the amount of Electrabel’s funding equals the amount pre-funded by the Belgian State, after which Electrabel and the Belgian State will fund the costs and expenses for the development activities on a 50/50 basis. |
| (46) | Belgium submits that the pre-funding by the Belgian State of the costs and expenses for the development activities is limited to any costs and expenses actually (to be) borne by Electrabel. A control mechanism is set up, as well as a “True-Up” (34) at the end of the contract period. Belgium also submits that the funding arrangements under the JDA++, as well as under any agreement between Electrabel and third parties, are on arm’s length and value for money basis. |
| (47) | Belgium argues that the JDA++ does not provide an economic advantage to Electrabel, since it merely concerns pre-funding and cost coverage of the development activities. Nevertheless, Belgium includes the JDA++ in the notified measure, as part of the set of sub-measures which could be assessed as one single intervention. |
3.3.2. Joint venture
| (48) | The Belgian State will invest, together with the nuclear operator Electrabel, in a joint venture (“JV”), named BE-NUC, which will own 89,807 % of the LTO Units (as Electrabel currently does). The remaining 10,193 % will stay in the hands of Luminus. Electrabel and the Belgian State will each own 50 % of BE-NUC and act as equal shareholders in terms of financial participation and share of power sales earnings. BE-NUC, as co-owner, will bear 89,807 % of the investments needed to extend the operation and the Belgian State will therefore indirectly bear 44,9035 % of the investment costs. However, BE-NUC will not become a nuclear operator: Electrabel is and will remain the sole nuclear operator of the two nuclear reactors through an Operations and Maintenance (“O&M”) Agreement (see section 3.3.8) which includes that BE-NUC will have control rights over the operating costs. |
| (49) | There will be no purchase by the Belgian State of co-ownership stakes in the LTO Units, but rather a transfer (partial demerger of the relevant assets) from Electrabel to the JV, according to the following main steps:
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| (50) | According to the Joint Partial Demerger Proposal (Schedule 4 of the SPA II), Electrabel will transfer its 89,807 % ownership rights regarding the LTO Units (as well as the related permits and any other assets required) to BE-NUC, in return for the distribution of BE-NUC shares to Engie (at that time Electrabel’s sole shareholder). The contribution of Electrabel to BE-NUC will be valued in consideration of the scrap value of the building, the value of the land and the value of immovable installations. |
| (51) | More precisely, according to the Joint Partial Demerger Proposal, the value of the contribution of Electrabel to BE-NUC is evaluated on the basis of:
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| (52) | This valuation of the contribution of Electrabel is reflected in the purchase price that will be paid by the Belgian State at the closing of the SPA II, which amounts to EUR 24,7 million (subject to adjustments) in order to acquire new shares in BE-NUC and retain a 50 % stake in BE-NUC. The Board of Directors of BE-NUC will request a (statutory) auditor or a certified accountant to prepare a report regarding the contribution in kind, assessing notably the applied valuation and the valuation methods used for that purpose. |
| (53) | A Shareholders» agreement between Electrabel, the Belgian government and BE-NUC was concluded to set up the corporate governance of BE-NUC and each of its shareholders’ rights. According to this agreement, the board of directors is composed of four directors, two appointed upon nomination of the Belgian government and two appointed upon nomination of Electrabel. BE-NUC’s chairperson and chief financial officer will always be Belgian government directors. The quorum at the board of directors is a simple majority, and its resolutions are voted by simple majority. Conflict of interest provisions have been put in place. |
| (54) | The role of the Belgian State as shareholder presupposes, inter alia, the financing of BE-NUC’s capital costs (CAPEX) and operating costs (OPEX), the management of shares and the exercise of shareholder rights (e.g., voting rights), and the support of the two directors of BE-NUC, appointed upon nomination of the Belgian State. |
| (55) | Certain assets currently held by Electrabel will be transferred to Engie so as to streamline their management from the perspective of Engie:
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| (56) | Belgium submits that the transfer will occur at no additional cost or disadvantage for Electrabel and a use funds arrangement has been foreseen to secure the use of the proceeds of the relevant sale. |
| (57) | As explained in more detail in section 3.4.7, the waste cap modifies the risk profile of the nuclear operator, which justifies and requires an adjustment of the existing security package, i.e., the removal of Electrabel’s non-European assets from the Electrabel perimeter and monitoring of the nuclear operator’s financial position. Moreover, Engie, as mother company of Electrabel, will guarantee that at least EUR 4 billion (equity value as of 30 June 2023) remains in Electrabel at the time of the closing of the agreement between the Belgian State and Electrabel (37). After closing, other safeguards apply such as the continued and enhanced monitoring of the financial position of the nuclear operator by the CPN/CNV, and the uncapped and uncancellable parent company guarantee granted by Engie for certain obligations of the nuclear operator. |
| (58) | Belgium argues that the JV constitutes a pari passu investment, as the two shareholders enter into the JV under equal terms and conditions and, as shareholders, with the same level of risk and rewards. Nevertheless, Belgium includes the JV in the notified measure, as part of the set of sub-measures which could be assessed as one single intervention. |
3.3.3. Shareholder financing
3.3.3.1.
| (59) | The Belgian government and Electrabel will each provide equity to BE-NUC through a share capital increase in order to finance any expense contemplated by BE-NUC’s shareholders’ agreement. |
| (60) | Electrabel will also issue to BE-NUC a shareholder loan (the «Electrabel Shareholder Loan») and so will the Belgian government (the «Belgian Government Shareholder Loan») to finance any expense contemplated by the shareholder’s agreement. The terms and conditions of the Electrabel Shareholder Loan and the Belgian Government Shareholder Loan are identical. |
| (61) | Belgium submits that the introduction of a shareholder loan in addition to the equity injection follows from financial and transactional considerations. On the one hand, the provision of the shareholder loan reduces transaction costs and grants more flexibility in the design of drawdown and repayment schedules. In particular, loan repayment provisions may be agreed upon with less regulatory constraints than dividend payments or equity repayments. On the other hand, the loan optimises the financial structure with respect to taxable income. In particular, up to 30 % of EBITDA is redeemable to deduct interest. |
| (62) | The loan will be granted on market terms, at interest rates that have not yet been set, but would be, according to the Shareholder Loan Agreements, set by the board of BE-NUC in accordance with the Shareholders’ Agreement by reference to prevailing market rates and any comparable third-party debt financing which may be available at the relevant time. |
| (63) | The total share capital contribution would amount in total, on the basis of preliminary computations in the signing financial model, to EUR [2 000-2 500] million and would be provided by both the Belgian government and Electrabel on pari passu terms in […] yearly instalments from […] to […] to finance the CAPEX of the LTO project. |
| (64) | This share capital contribution (equity injection and the shareholder loan) would be paid back to BE-NUC’s shareholders through a series of share capital reduction and be remunerated through the distribution of dividends and shareholder loan interest. |
| (65) | The internal rate of return of the stream of cashflows would amount to 7 %, defined as the nominal post-tax Project internal rate of return. |
| (66) | The split of the EUR [2 000-2 500] million shareholder financing into equity injection and the shareholder loan is not yet known. |
| (67) | Belgium submits that the shareholder funding obligations and the shareholder loan can be considered as pari passu financing. In particular, Belgium submits that the interest rate will be an arm’s length rate determined by reference to prevailing market rates and any comparable third-party debt financing, so that the shareholder loan will be granted on market terms. Nevertheless, Belgium includes the shareholder funding in the notified measure, as part of the set of sub-measures which could be assessed as one single intervention. |
3.3.3.2.
| (68) | The Shareholder Support Arrangement («SSA») sets out an arrangement under which Engie will have an obligation to provide financial support to Electrabel, if necessary for Electrabel to meet certain of its payment obligations under the O&M Agreement. |
3.3.4. Two-way contract for difference
| (69) | A Remuneration Agreement («RA») will be concluded between BE-NUC, Luminus and the «RA Counterparty», which will be an autonomous service with accounting independence within the Belgian State, named «BE-WATT» (see below section 3.7.3). The objective of the Remuneration Agreement is to address the market price uncertainty and de-risk the project revenues for BE-NUC and Luminus, which should receive sufficient revenues from the operation of the LTO Units to ensure their safe and reliable operation and economic viability, while allowing shareholders to reach the required market-conform financial return. Belgium submits that the RA is set up in a way to maintain the fair functioning of the wholesale electricity market, as all the electricity produced by the LTO Units will be sold on the day-ahead wholesale market and the LTO Units will be remunerated through a two-way contract for difference whose formula contains a market-reference price («MRP») reflecting the market equilibrium and exposing the plants to market incentives. |
| (70) | As a first part of the RA, a two-way contract for difference («CfD») will apply between the parties. The CfD will also be made available to Luminus, the other co-owner of the two nuclear reactors (see recital (4)). This means that a predefined indexed target price (the «strike price») will be guaranteed by the Belgian State. If the «reference market price» is higher than the strike price, the positive difference will be paid by BE-NUC and Luminus to the Belgian State. If the market price is lower, the negative difference will be paid by the Belgian State to BE-NUC and Luminus. The difference payments become payable on the first power date (the date on which the relevant LTO Unit injects electricity into the high-voltage grid for the first time after its initial legal end date) and will be made in proportion to BE-NUC’s and Luminus’ share of the power generated by the LTO Units. |
| (71) | The main parameters of the CfD are the market price and the strike price:
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| (72) | In the base case scenario, Belgium assumes that the costs to modernize the LTO Units amount to approximately EUR [2 000-2 500] million, resulting in a «preliminary strike price» of EUR [80-90] per MWh (39). |
| (73) | The actual value of the strike price will be set by BE-NUC on the basis of a financial model approved by the RA Counterparty in the course of 2025, prior to the LTO restart date, based on the cost of extending operation under nuclear safety requirements (the scope of the latter being defined by the Belgian nuclear safety agency), estimated on the basis of submitted quotes by contractors («initial strike price» ). The initial strike price will be recalculated as soon as possible after 31 December 2028 («True-up date» ) to reflect the actual timing to restart, LTO outages, operating, capital and financing cost up to that date (based on the actual invoices) and revised projections of these costs for the remainder of the 10-year prolongation period («revised strike price» ) (40), through a written agreement between BE-NUC and the RA Counterparty. The strike price will be indexed annually by reference to a weighted indexation calculation. After the True-up date, the strike price will in principle be fixed and not be recalculated, except under specific qualifying events («re-opener events» ) (41). |
| (74) | The strike price will be calculated using information from detailed financial models which will be produced and updated by BE-NUC. The financial model (and any updates thereto) is subject to the approval of the RA Counterparty. Where such approval is withheld, BE-NUC and the RA Counterparty may refer the determination of such a financial model issue to an independent expert in accordance with a specified expert determination procedure. |
| (75) | Belgium submits that while the CfD reduces BE-NUC’s exposure to market risk and market price variations, it includes risk-sharing mechanisms which should ensure that BE-NUC is still exposed to some basic market risk:
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| (76) | As mentioned in recitals (75)(b) and (75)(d), the Belgian State and Electrabel agreed on a target range for the nominal post-tax project IRR between 6 % and 8 % (i.e., a premium of 3-5 % over the estimated average 2023 risk-free rate of approximately 3 %). An independent analysis by Compass Lexecon (44) shows that this range is consistent with the theoretically computed premium and the empirical evidence from regulatory practice and public WACC estimates for comparable projects (see Table 3). In particular, the results of this independent analysis show that:
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| (77) | For the reasons mentioned in recital (76), Belgium considers the 6 %-8 % target IRR of the LTO project to be within the (lower end of the) likely range of market-based returns and therefore will not result in overcompensation. |
| (78) | Any proceeds from the CfD will flow into the general State budget but will be subject to separate accounting. They will be used primarily to fund the payments of the RA Counterparty under the CfD. Where the CfD proceeds would exceed the amounts necessary to finance the costs of the CfD, they could then be used to finance the costs of another CfD. Belgium commits that if any remaining CfD proceeds would be used for purposes of distributing them to undertakings, the distribution will be carried out in accordance with Article 19d(2), points (d) and (e) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1747. Belgium commits it will inform the Commission in case CfD proceeds would be distributed to undertakings, and, if need be, notify such a measure. |
| (79) | The counterparty role of the Belgian State in the two-way contract for difference mainly involves the execution and receipt of the various payments to and from BE-NUC and Luminus. Moreover, in that role, the Belgian State must also be able to verify and, if necessary, challenge the various calculations underlying those payments. |
| (80) | Belgium argues that the CfD is an appropriate instrument to tackle the identified market failures and specific risks as mentioned in recitals (23) and (24). Belgium submits that the CfD is appropriate to achieve the following objectives at the least cost, while preserving efficient market signals.
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| (81) | Belgium submits that, pursuant to Article 19d(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 (47), it is not obliged to apply a two-way CfD, since this provision imposes the use of mandatory two-way CfDs (or equivalent schemes with the same effects) only in relation to investments in new power-generating facilities. Belgium submits that in circumstances such as those of the LTO Project, where investments are made to prolong the lifetime of existing facilities, the use of two-way CfDs remains a possibility. Belgium submits that other forms of direct financial support schemes have been considered (fixed feed-in premium, one-way CfD and regulated asset base regime) but were not found appropriate for the LTO Project. Belgium submits that the two-way CfD provides the required support at a lower cost to consumers compared to alternative remuneration support mechanisms, such as the Belgian capacity mechanism, and argues that:
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| (82) | Belgium refers to Commission’s decisional practice, notably in the case of Hinkley Point C Nuclear Power Station in the UK (48), suggesting that CfD mechanisms may constitute State aid as they protect beneficiaries from price volatility in the electricity market and therefore grant a selective advantage on the counterparty. In addition, Belgium submits that, although it was not obliged to apply a two-way CfD in the case of the present LTO Project, the characteristics of the two-way CfD are fully aligned with the requirements and design principles foreseen by Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 in Article 19d(2) (see the arguments Belgium provided in recitals (75), (80) and (111) to (113)). |
| (83) | Belgium submitted an independent counterfactual analysis conducted by Compass Lexecon (49), which builds the cashflow streams of the project without a CfD and with three different, central electricity price curve projections (the one used for the signing financial model, built in the fourth quarter of the year 2022, and two other, counterfactual price curves, respectively built in the second and third quarters of the year 2023). Depending on the price curve used, the net present value («NPV») of the project, using a 7 % discount rate (equal to the target IRR), would amount to a range between minus EUR 303 million and EUR 107 million. The positive NPV results from the use of the signing financial model’s price curve, which is older than the other two, which yield negative NPVs. In addition, updated central price curves (built during the first quarter of year 2024) were used to further deepen the counterfactual analysis. The most optimistic updated price curve yields an NPV of EUR 21 million, while the two other updated price curves yield negative NPVs of minus EUR 1,1 billion and minus EUR 1 billion. Belgium therefore argues that the CfD is an appropriate instrument, compatible with State aid rules, necessary to guarantee the execution and profitability of the LTO Project, and does not dispute its State aid character. |
3.3.5. Minimum OPEX and capital payment
| (84) | If BE-NUC’s revenues are not sufficient to cover the costs payable in any month under the O&M Agreement, as well as any other operating, fuel and maintenance CAPEX costs (50) required for the operation of the LTO Units, then the RA Counterparty is required to make a shortfall payment to BE-NUC to ensure sufficient cashflow to meet these costs, in order to ensure nuclear safety at all times. The Minimum OPEX and capital payment therefore offers protection against losses from important unexpected unavailability of the LTO Units after the LTO Restart date, in order to ensure the Project’s long term economic viability. BE-NUC shall, in that regard, submit an annual reconciliation report. If the amount in this report is less than the aggregate minimum operating costs amounts, then the RA Counterparty will pay to BE-NUC an amount equal to the absolute value of the relevant shortfall. An equivalent payment will be made to Luminus, calculated to ensure proportionate treatment with BE-NUC. |
| (85) | Belgium submitted an independent counterfactual analysis conducted by Compass Lexecon (51), which simulates an unexpected 12-month unavailability event in 2029 affecting both LTO Units. Such an event, which represents the occurrence of an extreme operational risk, would generate significant losses for shareholders. The analysis shows a loss of EUR 832 million for year 2029, decreasing the NPV to minus EUR 512 million and the IRR to 1,7 %. |
| (86) | Belgium submits that the minimum OPEX and capital payments by the Belgian government may constitute State aid, as such payments are intended to cover shortfalls in revenues which would not be covered under normal market conditions (therefore creating a risk of funding gap). The payment of such funds therefore appears to grant BE-NUC a selective advantage on the market. |
3.3.6. Working capital facility
| (87) | As second part of the RA, BE-NUC will procure, either from its shareholders or an external party, a working capital facility («WCF») at the latest on the first LTO restart date to occur. |
| (88) | The WCF serves at funding the need in working capital stemming from the extension of the lifetime of the LTO Units as well as the operation of the LTO Units. BE-NUC will be allowed to draw down the WCF if the difference between its cash inflows and cash outflows is smaller than the estimated operational expenditures of the upcoming spending period defined in the Remuneration Agreement. The amount of the WCF shall be at least the average aggregate estimated operational expenditure for a period of three months. |
| (89) | The terms of the WCF, which shall be procured on market terms at the latest on the first LTO restart date to occur, are not yet known. |
| (90) | In effect, the WCF serves as an intra-year bridge to the annual minimum OPEX and capital payment, acting as a revolving credit facility that would be repaid yearly, if drawn down, by the minimum OPEX and capital payment provided by Belgium. |
3.3.7. SDC Loans
| (91) | Likewise, another part of the RA, the Belgian government will grant a loan to both BE-NUC and Luminus as of 1 July 2025 («SDC Loans»). |
| (92) | The SDC Loans are each composed of two different facilities (one per LTO Unit), each formed of two tranches, one of which relates to the shut-down costs of the relevant unit (see recital (41)) incurred by BE-NUC and Luminus from the legal shutdown date until the restart date of the relevant unit and the other which relates to the coverage of operating costs incurred with respect to the relevant unit until 31 December 2028. |
| (93) | The tranche relating to the shutdown period costs shall fund and pay for those costs required to maintain the LTO Units until the restart date. Should shut down period costs be greater than anticipated, the RA Counterparty shall procure that the tranche is resized. |
| (94) | The tranche relating to operating costs shall fund and pay for those costs required to operate the LTO Units until the True-up date (in particular in the context of the anticipation of the restart date from 1 November 2026 to 1 November 2025). It shall be used to cover operating cashflow shortfalls occurring before 31 December 2028. In effect, this means that the SDC Loans will cover for any WCF drawdown prior to December 2028, replacing the need for minimum OPEX and capital payment during this period (see sections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6 above). |
| (95) | The SDC Loans provided to BE-NUC and Luminus will be sized by reference to their proportionate share in the LTO Units, and consequently their respective share in the shutdown and operating costs. |
| (96) | The terms of the SDC Loans are the following:
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| (97) | In effect, according to the preliminary computations under the signing financial model submitted to the Commission, the SDC Loans are expected to be drawn down for an aggregated amount of EUR [500-700] million in […] instalments from […] until […], repaid in […] instalments from […] until […], and remunerated through […] interest payments from […] until […]. These computations will be updated in the financial model approved by the RA Counterparty in the course of 2025, prior to the LTO restart date, based on the cost of extending operation under nuclear safety requirements set out by the Belgian nuclear safety agency, estimated on the basis of submitted quotes by contractors. |
| (98) | Belgium considers that the SDC Loans constitute State aid. Belgium submits in this respect:
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3.3.8. O&M Agreement
| (99) | Under the O&M Agreement, Electrabel shall perform:
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| (100) | Certain services are explicitly excluded from the O&M Agreement, including services, works or activities in respect of decommissioning and dismantling of the LTO Units, which remain under the responsibility of Electrabel. |
| (101) | Pursuant to Article 12.1 of the O&M Agreement and subject to certain adjustments and exceptions, BE-NUC will pay Electrabel 89,807 % (reflecting Luminus holding of 10,193 % of the LTO Units) of all costs incurred in the provision of the LTO services and O&M services plus the relevant margin, being:
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| (102) | Belgium submits that the levels of margins are aligned with those applied under the LTO Partnership Agreement with Luminus (which itself covers a wide range of services including but not limited to O&M). The original agreement, concluded on 26 June 2003 and re-confirmed on 13 December 2023, with a third-party (Luminus) and covering similar services, is a relevant reference to support that the O&M Agreement reflects arm’s length costs for nuclear operations. In addition, Belgium argues that the financial risks borne by Electrabel are greater than under the Partnership Agreement with Luminus, since, under the O&M Agreement, the margin of Electrabel will be reduced in case of (non-excusable) cost overruns (i.e., costs not included in the budget as proposed by Electrabel and validated by the parties) and in case of unavailability of the plant beyond a target. |
| (103) | In addition, Belgium submits that the O&M Agreement includes certain cost controls, including rights for BE-NUC to audit Electrabel’s calculation of the fees and performance of the services and to request a benchmark review of the prices charged by Electrabel for technical affiliate services. |
| (104) | Finally, as the (sole) operator of the LTO Units and a service provider to BE-NUC under the O&M Agreement, Electrabel will be incentivised to achieve technical and economic performance of the LTO Units. In particular, under the O&M Agreement:
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| (105) | As a consequence, Belgium concludes that the O&M Agreement is limited to covering of costs incurred and that the financial conditions of the O&M Agreement are set to reflect market terms. Nevertheless, Belgium includes the O&M Agreement in the notified measure, as part of the set of sub-measures which could be assessed as one single intervention. |
3.3.9. Energy Management Services Agreement («EMSA»)
| (106) | Although BE-NUC will be the technical owner of the electricity produced by the LTO Units, the electricity output will be sold by an energy manager. To this purpose, BE-NUC will enter into an Energy Management Services Agreement («EMSA») with a third party or an Engie entity (Global Energy Management & Sales («GEMS»)). |
| (107) | The Implementation Agreement foresees that the EMSA will be awarded and tendered at the request of the Belgian government. If no successful tender takes place within certain time limits, Electrabel and the Belgian government shall negotiate and find an agreement, which must reflect the EMSA Terms (which are jointly decided by Belgian government and Electrabel). Failing such agreement, the pricing terms will be determined based on market conditions by an independent expert. |
| (108) | The EMSA will stipulate key terms, conditions and risk allocations and will, consequently, stipulate in a detailed manner how the electricity must be sold on the market by the energy manager. The energy manager appointed under the EMSA will only have limited power of decision on how the electricity produced by BE-NUC is sold, within the limits of a predefined Bidding and Imbalance Strategy («BIS») to be implemented in the EMSA (56). |
| (109) | The Bidding and Imbalance Strategy can be reviewed and amended from time to time (57). The Belgian government, in its capacity as RA Counterparty, has the final say. More precisely,
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| (110) | The agreements between the Belgian government and Electrabel foresee that all the electricity produced by the LTO Units will be sold on the day-ahead wholesale market, according to the BIS. This corresponds to the use of the day-ahead market («DAM») price as market reference price («MRP») in the CfD design (see recital (71)(a)). The Belgian Federal Commission for Electricity and Gas Regulation («CREG») provided its view on the choice of DAM price as MRP (58). The CREG questioned the choice of the DAM price and proposed as an alternative design the use of long-term products as part of the MRP, stating that the design of the CfD would amount to allocating the full strike price to the plants, thus incentivising a permanent, nominal run of the plants and reducing liquidity in the daily market. |
| (111) | According to Belgium, based on an independent analysis by Compass Lexecon (59), the DAM reference price allows for appropriate market risk allocation/hedging, together with the marketing arrangements provided in the BIS, in particular because it is granular and allows matching the MRP with the captured market prices. In addition, the CfD design based on the DAM price as MRP and electricity marketing arrangement fosters sound bidding behaviour. In particular, Belgium submits that selling the electricity on the day-ahead market incentivises sound bidding behaviour for the following reasons:
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| (112) | Belgium further notes that the DAM price is a suitable reference as it is transparent, robust, and as the DAM is liquid compared to other markets. In addition, Belgium argues that the chosen CfD formula design in combination with specific arrangements (MPRA, modulation arrangement) preserves incentives to operate and participate efficiently in the electricity market by providing incentives for production at times of high market prices and modulation arrangements at times of low prices. |
| (113) | Belgium also submits, based on the memo by Compass Lexecon, that the DAM price is particularly suited as MRP in the initial period of LTO works, notably compared to long-term products, since (i) it reduces the market risk for BE-NUC compared to using forwards as it allows to closely match the specific availability pattern during the initial period of the LTO works (as explained in section 3.2), and (ii) using futures as MRP could induce additional market risks for the plant operator due to the higher risk of unplanned outages in the initial period of the LTO works. |
| (114) | Finally, Belgium submits that the initial choice of the MRP may be revisited by the Belgian government, as RA Counterparty, up to three times over the contract duration, subject to BE-NUC and Luminus agreement, as from the end of the initial period of the LTO works. Any changes to the MRP would likely result in amendments to the BIS to accommodate the incentive of the JV to achieve that revised MRP. The Belgian government intends to base its position on this matter taking into account the advice from the CREG. |
| (115) | Belgium submits that the EMSA does not provide an economic advantage to Electrabel, since the EMSA will in principle be subject to an open, transparent, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure. Belgium argues that, even if no successful tender takes place, the parties will attempt to find an agreement reflecting EMSA Terms. Failing such an agreement, the alignment with market conditions would be ensured through the determination by an independent expert of the pricing terms to be applied. As a consequence, Belgium submits that the awarding and tendering modalities of the EMSA ensure the application of arm’s length and market conditions. Nevertheless, Belgium includes the EMSA in the notified measure, as part of the set of sub-measures which could be assessed as one single intervention. |
3.3.10. Administration Services Agreement («ASA»)
| (116) | The Administration Services Agreement («ASA») is an agreement entered into by BE-NUC with Electrabel. The Implementation Agreement provides with regard to the ASA that «Electrabel shall […] provide a written proposal to the Belgian government [BEGOV] describing the key terms and conditions on which Electrabel would be willing to enter into an administration services agreement with NuclearSub [BE-NUC] for the provision of the following services to NuclearSub [BE-NUC] on arms’ length terms: secretarial, accounting, tax, insurance, media relations and communications, legal document management, litigation management and compliance services’. |
| (117) | Belgium submits that, although the ASA has not been adopted yet, the Belgian government and Electrabel have foreseen in their agreements that the ASA will be concluded on arms» length terms, as mentioned in recital (116), thereby ensuring that it will be aligned on market terms and conditions. Nevertheless, Belgium includes the ASA in the notified measure, as part of the set of sub-measures which could be assessed as one single intervention. |
3.3.11. Indemnification of cost coverage losses in case of no closing
| (118) | The closing of the transaction is subject to the satisfaction and/or waiver of the Conditions Precedent (60). In principle, the Belgian State and Electrabel will bear 50/50 of the cost coverage losses in case of no closing, except under certain circumstances, where the party responsible will have to bear all costs incurred by the other. Hence, both Electrabel and the Belgian State are 100 % liable if there is no closing of the Transaction due to their own responsibility. |
| (119) | The cost coverage losses are limited to:
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| (120) | Belgium submits that this cost coverage arrangement is in line with normal market terms in comparable transactions, whereby each party is held liable for costs incurred in relation to (the preparation of) the agreement in case of no closing due to either party. Hence, Belgium considers that there is no economic advantage in this cost coverage arrangement, neither vis-à-vis Electrabel, nor vis-à-vis Luminus. Nevertheless, Belgium includes this cost coverage arrangement in the notified measure, as part of the set of sub-measures which could be assessed as one single intervention. |
3.4. Component 2: Cap on the nuclear operator’s liability for long-term storage and final disposal of nuclear waste and spent fuel
3.4.1. EU legislative framework
| (121) | The legislative framework applicable to radioactive waste and spent fuel in the European Union is grounded inter alia on the following two fundamental principles:
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| (122) | In addition, the Euratom Treaty calls on the Community to ensure the establishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of nuclear energy in the Community. |
| (123) | Belgium submits that Electrabel will keep some responsibilities as sole operator of the LTO Units, resulting from (1) European and Belgian legislation, and (2) contractual obligations of the Implementation Agreement, hereby respecting the «polluter pays» principle. |
| (124) | First, Electrabel will continue to assume all the responsibilities of a licensed operator of a nuclear power plant, including responsibilities regarding operating and maintaining the two nuclear reactors, their decommissioning and dismantling, which is also covered by a guarantee by the mother company Engie, and making the nuclear waste compliant with the contractual transfer criteria (see recital (133)(c)). Therefore, Electrabel remains exposed to extended civil liability and financial guarantee and insurance obligations.
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| (125) | Second, at contractual level, pursuant to Article 25.1.A of the O&M Agreement, Electrabel is responsible (and bound to compensate BE-NUC) in case of «any material action and/or material failure to act by Electrabel (in its capacity as Nuclear Operator) that would not have been undertaken or committed by a licensed operator of a nuclear power plant, seeking in good faith to perform its contractual, legal and regulatory obligations, and exercising the degree of diligence, skill, care and prudence reasonably expected of a licensed nuclear operator [...]» («LTO Operator Failure»). |
3.4.2. Current system of waste management and financing in Belgium
| (126) | Under the current regulations, the nuclear operator is financially (through the nuclear provision company, Synatom (64)) and operationally responsible for the decommissioning of the seven nuclear power plants. For the financial part, Electrabel is responsible together with EDF Belgium and Luminus (the «Contributing Companies») (65). The nuclear provisions for spent fuel and decommissioning waste are funded by Electrabel in accordance with the applicable accounting laws (including control by a statutory auditor) (66), are managed by Synatom (on its balance sheet) and are subject to the prudential control of an independent governmental authority, the Nuclear Provision Commission («CPN/CNV») (67). In addition, the nuclear operator is also financially and operationally responsible for the conditioning and management of the radioactive waste and spent fuel, and its long-term storage after its acceptance by NIRAS/ONDRAF until its final disposal. |
| (127) | Established in 1980, NIRAS/ONDRAF is the Belgian waste management agency, responsible for the management of all radioactive waste, today and in the future. NIRAS/ONDRAF manages waste legacy sites in Belgium and holds funds to pay for the management of interim storage, geological and near-surface disposal sites and socio-economic costs. The «polluter pays» principle holds since the producers of radioactive waste pay a fee for every waste package transferred to NIRAS/ONDRAF. Every owner of a nuclear installation or of nuclear waste should foresee the necessary means to pay for the liability. |
| (128) | A comprehensive inventory report is drawn up every 5 years by NIRAS/ONDRAF for all nuclear waste producers, in which the funds are evaluated. Future reference scenarios are estimated using reference scenarios elaborated by NIRAS/ONDRAF regarding radioactive waste, by Electrabel regarding decommissioning and by Synatom regarding spent nuclear fuel. The net present value of future liabilities must be present in the accounts of Synatom, and every 3 years there is an audit of the methodology, reference scenario, etc. The future liabilities are built up during the exploitation of the reactors with yearly interest supplements. Even after NIRAS/ONDRAF has accepted the waste, the nuclear operator remains liable for any costs incurred by NIRAS/ONDRAF which are not covered by the paid fees. This implies that for a very long period, the nuclear operator could still receive payment requests from NIRAS/ONDRAF. In addition, this also implies that if the nuclear operator no longer exists at that time, the Belgian State bears the responsibility of the full costs (68). |
| (129) | Following the CPN/CNV triennial revision decision issued on July 2023, the nuclear provisions, held on the balance sheet of Synatom, for dismantling activities (EUR 8,122 billion) and spent fuel management (EUR 9,070 billion) equalled a total amount of EUR 17,192 billion. In addition to this amount, outside the scope of supervision of the CPN/CNV, a provision of EUR 1,033 billion for operational waste, yet to be transferred to NIRAS/ONDRAF, is held on the balance sheet of Electrabel. This brings the current total amount of provisions related to nuclear liabilities to EUR 18,225 billion. |
3.4.3. Cap on nuclear waste payments («waste cap»)
| (130) | In order to reduce uncertainty regarding the cost of nuclear waste and spent fuel in the future, the «Phoenix Law» (see section 3.7.2) introduces a cap on the liability of producers of radioactive waste resulting from the production of electricity through nuclear energy. |
| (131) | The «waste cap» is a transfer of certain financial liabilities from the nuclear operator (Electrabel) to the Belgian State against the payment of a lump sum amount. The liabilities transferred are the liabilities in relation to the production, detention or ownership of conditioned radioactive waste and spent fuel of all seven Belgian nuclear units, subject to and after compliance of such radioactive waste and spent fuel with the relevant contractual transfer criteria. The conditioned radioactive waste and spent fuel are distributed in three types (69):
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| (132) | This radiological classification into three categories has been used historically by NIRAS/ONDRAF and is defined in a manner consistent with the International Atomic Energy Agency («IAEA») classification (70). This radiological classification is contractually established by NIRAS/ONDRAF with the various producers. The producers classify their historical, current and future waste according to this classification in their (preliminary) reference inventory that they must submit to NIRAS/ONDRAF. The producers thereby assume that their waste will either be stored in a yet-to-be-built storage facility in Dessel for category A waste or in a hypothetical single geological storage facility for category B and C waste and spent nuclear fuel. |
| (133) | The cap system works according to the following principles:
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| (134) | Belgium submits that the volumes underlying the Capped Amounts are based on the waste inventory used for the last CPN/CNV revision of the nuclear provisions in 2022 and are the current best estimate of the volume of conditioned nuclear waste and spent fuel produced (and to be produced) by the seven nuclear power plants in a no-LTO scenario. For each waste package a conversion factor is determined to accommodate optimization in the waste production during decommissioning. To properly reflect the risk that waste packages may need post-conditioning after transfer to the Belgian State, the rate of consumption of the waste credit is not solely linked to its physical volume and therefore some waste packages will consume more of the volume credit of a waste category than others. This is an incentive for the nuclear operator to produce nuclear waste packages bearing a minimal risk for the Belgian State. In the event of an overestimation of volumes and of the Capped Amounts, the Belgian State retains the full amount, and no reimbursement will be made to the nuclear operator. |
| (135) | Belgium submits that the Capped Amounts, mentioned in recital (133)(a), are the result of applying a risk premium to the existing nuclear provisions that are based on the current waste inventory, and the industrial reference scenario of NIRAS/ONDRAF and the nuclear operator. Therefore, the lumpsum payment only grants a limited volume credit per waste category. Section 3.4.5 provides more details about the establishment of the Capped Amounts and calculation of the risk premium. |
| (136) | The amounts of the volume adjustment fees are determined in the Phoenix Law (see section 3.7.2). The amounts are established as the arithmetic average between (i) the capped amount of the waste category divided by the number of volume credits of that category and (ii) the marginal cost of one additional volume credit. Belgium submits that, hereby, the waste producer is not paying twice for costs that are already covered by the Capped Amounts, while providing incentives to produce as little additional waste as possible and covering the risks related to the long-term management of additional waste. |
| (137) | Belgium submits that the waste transfer deal mitigates the risks for both, the Belgian State and Engie.
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3.4.4. Management of the nuclear waste fund by Hedera
| (138) | Since the nuclear operator, after payment in full and final of a lumpsum amount (although under certain conditions) will be exempt from and will no longer be financially liable for the obligations transferred regarding the management of radioactive waste and nuclear spent fuel, the Belgian State must organise itself for those obligations and resources in the very long term. |
| (139) | Hedera is established as a new public institution sui generis to manage assets dedicated to the financing of the Belgian State’s long-term commitments. The amounts received must be invested, to generate the desired return to pay the costs for waste management when they are due. The fixed amounts will also have to be sufficiently ringfenced from the general budget of the Belgian State, so that the amount is only used to pay for the costs for the long-term storage and final storage and cannot be used for other purposes or to absorb any future budget deficits. |
3.4.5. Establishment of the Capped Amounts
| (140) | The computation of the EUR 15 billion of Capped Amounts is based on the current nuclear provisions of the nuclear operator (the base amount) and a risk premium. |
3.4.5.1.
| (141) | Belgium submits that the base amount of nuclear provisions of the nuclear operator includes already margins for contingencies, uncertainties and other risks that may arise in relation to dismantling, radioactive waste management and spent fuel management. Contingency margins relating to the disposal of waste are determined by NIRAS/ONDRAF and built into its nuclear waste tariffs. The nuclear operator also estimates appropriate margins for each cost category in its nuclear provisions. |
| (142) | The nuclear provisions for managing spent fuel cover all of the costs linked to the base scenario, including on-site storage, transportation, conditioning, storage and geological disposal. Their present value is calculated based on the following principles:
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| (143) | The nominal discount rate used by the CPN/CNV is 3 % (including an inflation rate of 2 %), based on the opinion of the CPN/CNV of 7 March 2023 (74). Belgium submits that a long-term discount rate of 1 % in real terms can be considered prudent, since it is in line with current actuarial practices, such as the EIOPA curve (75), and more conservative than those previously applied in similar financial transfers (76). |
| (144) | For the various phases, margins for contingencies, reviewed by CPN/CNV, are included. |
| (145) | The present value of the obligation to manage nuclear waste produced by the decommissioning activities are determined based on the following principles and inputs:
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| (146) | The nuclear waste tariffs of NIRAS/ONDRAF are based on an industrial reference scenario:
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| (147) | The net present value of the future liabilities regarding decommissioning and radioactive waste management must be present in the accounts of Synatom as nuclear provision company. The discount factor applied to these liabilities decreased from 5 % in 2005 to 3,5 % at the end of 2018 to progressively bring it in line with the long-term risk-free interest rate based on the rate of government bonds (OLO) and AAA-rated corporate bonds (77). The discount factor affects the amount that nuclear operators must set aside today to cover future decommissioning and waste management costs: a higher discount rate reduces the present value of future liabilities, thereby reducing the amount that needs to be provisioned currently, while a lower discount rate increases the present value, requiring higher current provisions. As of 2019, the CPN/CNV decided to further decrease the discount rate and to implement a separate approach for spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste/decommissioning funds. At the end of 2021 the discount factor was 3,25 % for spent nuclear fuel and 2,5 % for nuclear waste/decommissioning. |
| (148) | The discount rate established in the context of the 2022 triennial revision is important since it establishes the long-term discount factor and hereby influences the amount of provisions to be transferred by the nuclear operator to the Belgian state. In this respect, the CPN/CNV considers in its advice of 7 March 2023 that:
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| (149) | Considering the arguments in recital (148), the CPN/CNV proposed to keep the discount rate for dismantling activities at 2,5 %, while adjusting the discount factor for nuclear waste/decommissioning and spent fuel liabilities, applying a two-step approach, consisting in applying a discount factor based on the actual 30-year OLO rate of 3,17 % for the first 30 years, and applying a discount factor of 2,17 % based on the risk-free rate for the 30 years thereafter. The CPN/CNV argues that this methodology is balanced and allows the cash flows to be actualised over a long period at a lower interest rate. The remaining period with the risk-free interest rate must correspond to the main cash flows for the construction of the deep repository of radioactive waste of category B and category C, including spent fuel recognised as waste in the reference scenario of NIRAS/ONDRAF. |
| (150) | The CPN/CNV also refers to additional risks regarding the transfer of nuclear waste liabilities that the Belgian government would need to consider in the negotiations with Engie on the transfer of waste liabilities:
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| (151) | The capped nuclear liabilities that are transferred to the Belgian State were identified and the corresponding existing provisions allocated, as part of the Capped Amounts. Table 4 shows the allocation of the EUR 18,225 billion existing provisions between Electrabel (EUR 8,410 billion) and the Belgian government (EUR 9,815 billion), according to the waste cap agreement. Table 4 Allocation of the nuclear provisions according to the waste cap agreement
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| (152) | The Capped Amounts were determined after taking into consideration every step of the management of the nuclear waste package and spent fuel after their transfer to the Belgian State, with the support of NIRAS/ONDRAF (for the industrial scenario) and the advice of the CPN/CNV (for the discount rate) (see Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3). |
Figure 1
Allocation of capped nuclear liabilities for category A and B waste transfer
Figure 2
Allocation of capped nuclear liabilities for spent nuclear fuel transfer
Figure 3
Allocation of capped nuclear liabilities for category C waste transfer
Autorisation des aides d’État dans le cadre des dispositions des articles 107 et 108 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne — Cas à l’égard desquels la Commission ne soulève pas d’objections — SA.114781 30/12/2024 Autorisation des aides d’État dans le cadre des dispositions des articles 107 et 108 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne — Cas à l’égard desquels la Commission ne soulève pas d’objections — SA.114943 30/12/2024 Autorisation des aides d’État dans le cadre des dispositions des articles 107 et 108 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne — Cas à l’égard desquels la Commission ne soulève pas d’objections — SA.116252 30/12/2024 Avis institutionnel — 52024AB0042 30/12/2024
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